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Editors' Foreword

TOM LAWSON and JAMES JORDAN

A Distant Shore:
The Holocaust and Us

**DEBÓRAH DWORK and
ROBERT JAN VAN PELT**

Grey-Collar Worker:
Organisation Theory in Holocaust Studies

MICHAEL THAD ALLEN

Writing 'Bystanders' into Holocaust History
in More Active Ways: 'Non-Jewish'
Engagement with Ghettoisation, Hungary 1944

TIM COLE

Whither Holocaust Studies in Sweden?
Some Thoughts on *Levande Historia*
and Other Matters Swedish

PAUL A. LEVINE

Trauma, Postmodernism and Descent:
Contemporary Holocaust Criticism in Britain

SUE VICE

Book Reviews

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Grey-Collar Worker: Organisation Theory in Holocaust Studies

MICHAEL THAD ALLEN

Stereotypes of the banal bureaucrat as fashioned by Hannah Arendt in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* have more to do with intellectuals' anxieties about modern organisation than they have to do with the Holocaust or the institutions of genocide. Moreover, the overwhelming influence of Arendt's interpretation has paradoxically helped to muzzle the voice of Holocaust survivors. Institutions like Auschwitz could never have functioned without countless victims forced to serve in its bureaucracies. Victims toiled in what Primo Levi called the grey zone, where the boundaries between the persecuted and perpetrators shifted endlessly. Thus if Eichmann was a 'white-collar' worker, victims were 'grey-collar.' This was a labour of hate. Those who survived it nevertheless provide a neglected source on the bureaucracy of annihilation. We hear their voices so seldom precisely because the cliché of Arendt's banal bureaucrat has made us nearly deaf to their observations. For what they have to say about bureaucracy and genocide does not fit her stereotype. Listening to them can potentially bring Holocaust studies closer to the reality, rather than the banality, of evil.

Where has Adolf Eichmann gone?

I do not refer to the real Adolf Eichmann. Anyone who wanted information on the real, historic Eichmann need only consult fine books such as those of Hans Safrian, Yaacov Lozowick or David Cesarani, excellent portraits not only of Eichmann but his milieu. These are so well researched, it seems unlikely that much more can be learned about the historic Eichmann or his coterie. Highly motivated, energetic and thoroughly committed National Socialists populated the Reich Security Main Office in which they worked.¹ They consciously served their regime and scarcely let rule-bound bureaucracies impede their goals, among them the destruction of the European Jews.²

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So I refer neither to Eichmann nor his real, historic Eichmann men. I refer to his Doppelgänger, the Eichmann of Hannah Arendt's 'Report on the Banality of Evil' – a bureaucrat 'perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong', afflicted by an 'utter ignorance of everything that was not directly, technically and bureaucratically, connected with his job', a blinkered drone who, 'to put the matter colloquially, *never realised what he was doing*'.³

For if the real, historic Eichmann casts much doubt on the existence of this Doppelgänger, most are prepared to confirm Arendt's most radical claim: the banality of ordinary bureaucrats is the key to understanding the dynamism, scope and scale of the Holocaust. This is despite most contemporary scholarship, which provides little evidence that banal bureaucrats sustained or radicalised Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945.⁴

Plentiful evidence suggests that Nazi functionaries found something like eros in the bureaucracies of genocide. Some lived for them precisely *because* they knew what they were doing. A survivor of Majdanek's medical service, the prisoner Josef Ludwig, recounted that an SS Sanitation Officer boasted after a gassing: 'That goes very quickly; their lungs collapse. You should have seen that, how they were all still standing when they were dead! It was so full and they were so densely packed that not one could fall over'. Ludwig then recalled that the SS man 'adopted a very manly pose whenever he allowed himself to speak of such gruesome things to me'.⁵ Clearly some SS men found modern institutions to be a satisfactory outlet for what Saul Friedländer calls '*Rausch*' (intoxication); or what Michael Burleigh has recently called the 'political religion' of National Socialism; or the kind of cruel mockery of the victim that philosopher Jonathan Glover describes as the 'cold joke'.⁶ Is this banal?

There would seem to be something faith-based in belief in Eichmann's Doppelgänger. The stereotype of the bureaucratic drone is so powerful as to be proof against all contrary evidence. Arendt herself provides a striking example. During the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, she came to the conclusion that none of the defendants were really bureaucrats. '[T]he extermination of millions of people through gas ... was organised with meticulous care by desk murderers in more exalted positions who did not have to dirty their hands'. Evidence presented at trial showed that SS men at Auschwitz had

acted, not as 'thoughtless' cogs, but as conscious, even eager genocidaires. They had often taken initiative. Therefore, Arendt averred, they 'were no desk murderers'.⁷

How can this square with the statement of one of the defendants, Hans Aumeier? 'I had to prepare 30–40 reports daily and these were submitted to [Rudolf] Höss [the Kommandant] for his signature. In addition, I had to receive the prisoner transports as well as supervise the censorship of prisoner correspondence and the reception of packages'.⁸ While writing out these reports, Aumeier had demonstrated that he thought for himself. Such evidence did not conform to prevalent stereotypes of bureaucrats. So, in effect, Arendt declared that the likes of Aumeier could not possibly be one. Her capable pen transformed one of the most gargantuan bureaucracies of murder in history into an entity that bore as little resemblance to the real, historic Auschwitz as the real Eichmann did to his Doppelgänger.

But if Holocaust studies cannot locate the Doppelgänger Eichmann in Auschwitz (an institution that the real, historic Eichmann actually visited) where else could he possibly be? And if we are prepared to accept that a massive complex like Auschwitz did not really function bureaucratically, are we not perilously close to abandoning Arendt's most penetrating insight? Her great contribution was namely to point out forcefully that modern organised society produced the Holocaust, and that Eichmann was the exemplary bureaucrat. The only problem is that modern bureaucrats in dynamic institutions most often resemble the real Eichmann, the real Aumeier, and not Arendt's construct.

Yet this Doppelgänger has become such a powerful stereotype, that one finds him in references to authoritarian governments vastly removed in time and place from Hitler's Germany. Consider a recent Sunday edition of the *New York Times* – Michael Massing predicates an article on a quote from Arendt's epilogue that is so frequently invoked in Holocaust studies: 'The trouble with Eichmann ... was precisely that so many were like him ... terribly and terrifyingly normal'. Massing proceeds to compare Eichmann, who was a middling white-collar worker, with Saddam Hussein. Is there no difference between middling functionaries and a sovereign of a nation state? This difference was the very core of Arendt's argument.

Undeterred, Massing then finds analogies between Eichmann and the Hutu killers of Rwanda, who murdered with machetes. Did this butchery share much in common with paper work?

As evidence that these are indeed comparisons of like to like, Massing excerpts from an interview with a Rwandan genocidaire:

I can say this: outside the marshes, our lives seemed quite ordinary. We sang on the paths ... we had our choice amid abundance. We chatted about our good fortune, we soaped off our bloodstains in the basin, our noses enjoyed the aromas of full cooking pots. We rejoiced in the new life about to begin by feasting on leg of veal. We were hot at night atop our wives, and we scolded our rowdy children ... We put on our field clothes. We swapped gossip at the cabaret, we made bets on our victim, spoke mockingly of cut girls, squabbled foolishly over looted grain. We sharpened our tools on whetting stones. We traded stories about desperate Tutsi tricks, we made fun of every 'Mercy!' cried by someone who'd been hunted down, we counted up and stashed away our goods.⁹

The vivid visual descriptions, the beckoning expectation of a 'new life' (which should be familiar to anyone who has read *Good Old Days*¹⁰) – all this suggests a sensual experience of empowerment, a pleasure in killing, what German law defines as '*Mordlust*'. After this extraordinary passage Massing nevertheless concludes: 'How else to describe this but the banality of evil?'¹¹

How else indeed? Is it ordinary to be 'hot' after hacking up young girls? The killer's statement suggests an eroticism, a collective arousal in organised killing. To be fair, perhaps a translator rendered this prose into English anapests, iambs and flowing consonance. But why is it that we read such a prose poem and see the 'banality of evil'? It is this disjunction between evidence and the need to believe in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* that begs explanation.

Eichmann's Doppelgänger has more to do with intellectuals' anxieties about modern organisation than it has to do with the Holocaust or the institutions of genocide. Moreover, as I will try to illustrate at the close of this article, the overwhelming influence of Arendt's interpretation has paradoxically helped to muzzle the voice of Holocaust survivors. Institutions like Auschwitz could never have

functioned without countless victims forced to serve in its bureaucracies. Victims toiled in what Primo Levi called the grey zone, where the boundaries between the persecuted and perpetrators shifted endlessly. Thus if Eichmann was a 'white-collar' worker, victims were 'grey-collar'. This was a labour of hate. Those who survived it nevertheless provide a neglected source on the bureaucracy of annihilation. We hear their voices so seldom precisely because the cliché of Arendt's banal bureaucrat has made us nearly deaf to their observations. For what they have to say about bureaucracy and genocide does not fit her stereotype. Listening to them can potentially bring Holocaust studies closer to the reality, rather than the banality, of evil.

The Modern Organisation Man and the Holocaust

During the first third of the twentieth century many became aware that a 'new man' had begun to play a disproportionate role in shaping modern society. This man was neither bourgeois nor a worker. He was the mid-level manager, the white-collar worker, or the petty administrator (whatever we choose to label him). Siegfried Kracauer and Hans Speier were among the first to explore this new work culture. Both were conscious that the growing complexity of industrial society had created new salaried employees. These exerted enormous influence over the means of production, and yet they did not own them. They could never count as classic entrepreneurs, least of all among entrepreneurs. The new mid-level managers gained their positions through educational credentials, and yet they did not count among humanistic professionals, again, least of all among doctors, lawyers or professors. Like the blue-collar worker, they were creatures of a new, intensifying division of labour in modern corporations, and yet they struggled above all to distinguish themselves from the proletariat. Thus they did not count as blue collar, least of all among workers.

The new white-collar men seemed neither fish, nor flesh nor fowl. If many did not know quite what to make of these 'new men', few believed their debut on the world-historical stage boded anything good for humankind. Speier labelled them (in German the *Angestellten*) 'value-parasites'; Kracauer accused them of 'spiritual

homelessness'.¹² Even as many begrudgingly accorded the new white-collar workers a singular place in industrial society, few ever identified with them. They are usually simply subsumed among that often invoked category, the 'middle class' or 'petit bourgeois', which, as Arno Mayer once noted, 'has had a harder time commanding scholarly attention than either the power elite or the proletariat: it has no patronage to dispense; it is not seen as a revolutionary threat; and it lacks the romance of utter wretchedness ... that commands empathetic scrutiny'.¹³

Speier's work in particular greatly influenced the American sociologist C. Wright Mills. Among other things, Mills was responsible for translating the writings of Max Weber for an American audience. In the 1950s he also wrote *White Collar*, exploring the work world of the new twentieth-century office. Given the powerful influence of Weber's interpretation of bureaucratic rationalisation, it is no surprise that Mills blamed modern organisations for a malaise of alienation and stunted moral development:

Among white-collar people, the malaise is deep rooted; for the absence of any order of belief has left them morally defenseless as individuals and politically impotent as a group ... white-collar man has no culture to lean upon except the contents of a mass society that has shaken him and seeks to manipulate him to its alien ends.¹⁴

American intellectuals had needed little prompting from immigrants such as Speier in order to engender native contempt for mid-level managers and office workers. In the nineteenth century we already have Herman Melville's *Bartleby the Scrivener*. Lewis Mumford labelled the white-collar worker the 'penny-in-the-slot automaton'.¹⁵ Now, Arendt seemed to suggest, he had caused the Holocaust.

More often than not, the agency of this class is not so much explained as assumed not to exist. An intensified division of labour is held responsible for the white-collar workers' spiritual emptiness. They are undeniably specialists, deeply embedded in hierarchies to which they contribute but cannot conceive or control alone. They receive orders and convey them further along chains of authority. And rather than acting in any direct, personal relationship with

employees, they are paid salaries to manage from afar. In the process they depersonalise and deskill even themselves. Unlike the (often overly idealised) classic entrepreneur, they do not and cannot own the means of production. Therefore they supposedly remain incapable of pursuing any personal moral vision, and also seem to escape personal responsibility. 'Organisation men' supposedly submit their individual will to purely instrumental calculation. For this reason many condemn their soullessness; worse, they stand accused of imposing their own soullessness upon the rest of the world. Variants of this view can be found in contemporary popular books or pop-metaphysicians' condemnation of 'flatlanders'.¹⁶

Whereas Speier and others influenced American social scientists before and during the Second World War, in the 1950s and 1960s American intellectuals quickly re-exported their dyspepsia with mid-level management back to Germany. In these decades, American managerial techniques travelled to Europe as part of Marshall Plan aid, and, before that, as part of military occupation. German managers also resumed the brisk industrial tourism that had characterised the pre-war period. They visited American corporations in search of ideas, technology and organisational innovation. American subsidiaries also moved into the West German market. With this exchange, a counter-culture of discontent with corporate bureaucracy quickly followed. Moreover, it tapped into longstanding angst in the face of American commercial expansion.¹⁷

For example, Vance Packard's *The Pyramid Climbers* was reprinted repeatedly in German within a year of its American publication. Packard's intent was to reform American-style management, and he directed a scathing critique at what he punningly called 'The Bland New Leaders' of the modern economy: 'The human managers are expected to be at all times absolutely logical and at no time humanly emotional'; he referred to them as 'component parts of the management machinery'.¹⁸ The manager as a 'cog' was already a well-established cliché.

The trepidation of Speier or Kracauer had turned to outright hostility by the next generation of intellectuals. Thus, when Arendt made a failed vacuum-oil salesman cum petty administrator a central focus of this resentment, she tapped into the most current theory of modern organisations among professional historians, journalists and

social scientists of her day. *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, arguably the single most influential history of the Holocaust, held the vacuity of modern managers accountable for genocide.

Thus if German and American scholars of the Holocaust remain captivated by Eichmann's Doppelgänger in the bureaucratic machinery of genocide, it is at least partly due to the common preoccupation among cultural elites with white-collar workers. Hans Mommsen and, earlier, Raul Hilberg both identified 'self-operating' mechanisms leading to Auschwitz. Martin Heidegger attributed the Holocaust to technical rationality in modern society as early as 1949.¹⁹ This, then, is one powerful reason why *Eichmann in Jerusalem* outlives the long since executed Eichmann in Jerusalem. Intellectuals have sought to use the Holocaust to heap scorn on the brave new men of twentieth-century industrial society.²⁰

Arendt in the 'American Century'

Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that Arendt, as she had a knack for doing all her life, posed the most interesting questions. She herself never undertook any explicitly comparative work and never contrasted Eichmann's office with any other organisations elsewhere. But she clearly intended for *Eichmann in Jerusalem* to offer a comparative perspective in the broadest sense. She wanted her readers to see Eichmann as exemplary of modern man and his Department IV B 4 as exemplary of any modern office. Eichmann served as a window through which to view not only the Holocaust, but also western civilisation in the twentieth century.²¹

Arendt understood the Holocaust not just as a German event or a Jewish catastrophe. It challenged every presumption of western civilisation. Many have attributed this temperament in Arendt to her training as a philosopher in search of universals. It seems equally likely that it had to do with her direct experience of persecution. In 1933 she was arrested by the Gestapo, but met with lenient treatment from a gentile official. She left for Geneva via Prague and eventually settled in exile in Paris. Her experience there convinced her that racial hatred was no German monopoly. She was arrested again – not by the Nazis – but by the French. Some of them made her Gestapo officer of 1933 seem like a gentleman. Thus she never

mistook Hitler's seizure of power as the exclusive work of Nazis. The near universal presence of antisemitism led her to see National Socialism as a disaster for western civilisation, not just Germany. For this reason Eichmann intrigued her as the quintessential western Organisation Man, not just an SS policeman, and she anticipated by two generations preoccupation with 'ordinary men'.

Likewise she understood the victims in universal terms. The National Socialist onslaught upon Europe was an attack upon 'human diversity as such', upon all that is valuable about human plurality.²² For her, the uniqueness of the Holocaust derived from its ability to make everyone into persecutors and victims at the same time. Her oft quoted statement – 'Where all are guilty, nobody in the last analysis can be judged' – points to her dilemma, for this woman, more than almost anyone else in the twentieth century, took judgement deadly seriously.²³ Indeed she counted it as one of the most fundamental acts of the human condition.

She turned to the unique institutions of modernity in search of sound judgement about why the Holocaust came to pass. Like Raul Hilberg, whose work she relied upon, she held the whole of organised society responsible. 'The number of those who are responsible and guilty will be relatively small', she noted, 'There are many who share responsibility without any visible proof of guilt. There are many more who have become guilty without being in the least responsible'.²⁴ But more so even than Hilberg she stressed that the Nazi killing machinery presented a universal dilemma confronting modern societies: 'Institutions ... left to themselves without control and guidance by men, turned into monsters devouring nations and countries'.²⁵

Refreshingly, she never settled for any single, sterile act of condemnation. Denouncing evil was not enough for her. She believed passionately in the vital mission of intellectuals, a mission that many today are too cynical to recall without mockery. With Hermann Broch, Heinrich Blücher, Alfred Döblin and many others she understood her project as the reconstruction of a western civilisation in which humanity might become possible again. As William Sheridan Allen once joked, this smart set seemed to have absorbed all the classics of Latin and Greek as we absorbed Sesame Street.²⁶ If Hitler's racial empire had murdered culture, they set themselves the task of raising it from the dead.

And they were extraordinarily tough. *Eichmann in Jerusalem* sparked what might be considered the first 'historians' debate', the periodic fits of academic hysteria that break out over interpretations of the Holocaust and Nazi Germany. One can list them off: David Abraham's *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic*; Arno Mayer's *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?*; Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners*; and most recently Norman Finkelstein's *The Holocaust Industry*. In Germany they have been paralleled by the *Historikerstreit*, the publication of Götz Aly and Susanne Heim's *Vordenker der Vernichtung*, or the recent Wehrmacht exhibition. These controversies seem to break out with varying degrees of vitriol something like every five years.

No doubt others will follow, but Arendt set the paradigm for ever after: special conferences were held for no other purpose than to discredit the author. Arendt stood accused of shallow analysis, neglecting all standards of methodical research, and writing a book for no other purpose than fame or sensationalism. Her critics thundered in gerund-heavy, Germanic adjectival hyperbole that she had a penchant for 'outrageous sensationmongering' and an 'enfant-terrible complex'.²⁷ And yet she found a popular market for her work that exceeded anything enjoyed by her critics.

Professors were quick to castigate her 'tone'. Upon close inspection, it is difficult to see what this meant, except that Arendt had said something distasteful to them. In any case, her academic critics demonstrated no mastery of good manners. In a 1964 forum hosted by *Dissent* and convened for no other reason than to discredit *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, both Daniel Bell and Raul Hilberg tried to defend the substance of Arendt's work. Hilberg was booed from the audience. A panellist pounded the speaker's table in outrage. Irving Howe stood up to let it be known that 'EVEN THE RUTHLESS TROTSKY had understood more about the "human condition" than certain philosophers who had written about it'. All the while Alfred Kazin disparaged speakers who rose to take Arendt's part: 'Who asked you to come up here? Who asked you for your opinion?'²⁸ Still, most controversies in Holocaust studies fade quickly into obscurity, only to live a spectral life in historiographical essays. *Eichmann in Jerusalem* never has.²⁹ We continue to be drawn to its comparative perspective, its promise to

tell us something about modern, organised society and not just about the SS or Nazi Germany.

The furore that engulfed Arendt arose almost exclusively in reaction to her interpretation of the Jewish Councils. There is no need to dwell on this here, except to say that few have ever defended her argument. On the other hand, its guiding sentiment has been largely sustained. Arendt was, after all, pointing out what scholars and survivors repeatedly underline. In Nazi Germany everyone could potentially find themselves a perpetrator and a victim. The memoirs of Primo Levi and Rudolf Vrba plumb these same depths.³⁰ Omer Bartov's recent attempts to develop a unified theory of Holocaust victimology is a somewhat more circumspect iteration of Arendt's original insight. He too argues that victims and persecutors co-constructed one another.³¹ I think it plausible to argue that Arendt erred due to the real strength of her synthesis. She saw Jewish complicity in the Holocaust itself as part of the modern, organised nature of the crime. And there can be little doubt that the Jewish Councils were bureaucracies that facilitated, however unwillingly, the Nazis' work.³²

But if Arendt's polemic against the Jewish Councils has attracted sustained critical scrutiny, the same cannot be said for her condemnation of 'malignant bureaucratic twerps who might, under other circumstances, have sold used cars or insurance ...'.³³ This is ironic, for Arendt's understanding of modern bureaucracy was rudimentary at best and relied, for the most part, upon prejudices common to intellectuals of her day. The longevity of Eichmann's *Doppelgänger* threatens to undercut her most fundamental insights. That is, comparative history of genocidal regimes repeatedly underscores conscious, popular participation in the killing. If a bunch of bureaucratic twerps, all the while having no idea what they were doing, spurred on the Holocaust, Nazi Germany would seem to be the only regime in which this ever occurred. Eichmann has ceased to be twentieth-century Man. He now seems increasingly unique.³⁴

The supposed malaise condemned by Mills or Packard is the very crux of *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, and many rose to defend this because they shared Arendt's unease with modern, organised society. David Riesman, author of *The Lonely Crowd*, even chided Arendt for not being 'functionalist' enough. After reviewing *The Origins of Totalitarianism* he wrote to her:

You tend ... to assume that Stalin and Hitler are more calculating than I think is the case ... You explain as policy what is partly the outcome of an elaborate and complex institutional arrangement ... You assume that the Nazis knew at the beginning what they wanted at the end. Were they not rather like an upwardly mobile youth who looks only a few steps up the ladder and for whom getting there is the most important thing? When he gets there he will decide what to do ... and call in the appropriate experts.³⁵

By the 1960s Arendt had made Eichmann into just such a ladder-climber. This *Doppelgänger* was perfectly constructed to be the target of American intellectuals' collective scorn for 'White-Collar Man'.

Arendt systematically misjudged Eichmann precisely because the reality of mid-level management was so repugnant to her. But it is worth asking whether this interpretation accurately represents the 'desk-job criminal' (*Schreibtischtäter*). One poignant insight might be drawn from another American observer of the new middle classes, Richard Hoffstadter. Hoffstadter once challenged C. Wright Mills, 'You have somehow managed to get into your portrait of the white-collar man a great deal of your personal nightmare, writing about him as though he must feel as you would feel if you were in his position'.³⁶ Has Holocaust studies not committed a similar, understandable error? Have we fundamentally misunderstood the world of the modern office as if managers lived it as we presume we would have, that is by being alienated? The real, historic Eichmann and his bureaucratic accomplices seem to have embraced it.

Instead of examining why ordinary men like Eichmann came to identify passionately with modern institutions, Arendt constructed an alienated *Doppelgänger*. Working on the presupposition that alienation – not conscious identification – was the key to totalitarianism, she also struggled to account for the confluence of mass participation in political repression. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* invokes a vague entity she called the 'mob' to explain why the Nazi movement had any mass base at all. Her definition of the alienated *déclassé*, 'the residue of all classes', is the key:

The mob is primarily a group in which the residue of all classes are represented. This makes it so easy to mistake the mob for

the people, which also comprises all strata of society. While the people in all great revolutions fight for true representation, the mob always will shout for the 'strong man', the 'great leader'. For the mob hates society from which it is excluded ...³⁷

It is almost as if one is qualified to count as part of the true 'people', in Arendt's eyes, if one embraces political freedom.³⁸

At the very least, this would seem a dubious gauge of social movements, but Arendt's implication was clear. 'The people' would never consciously embrace a criminal regime. National Socialism was manifestly, undeniably criminal. Therefore, she concluded, it could not be the outgrowth of the real German people. Only with great difficulty could she account for self-conscious citizens who identified passionately, not with virtue or freedom, but with irrational racial imperialism and wars of aggression. By recasting Eichmann as a *déclassé* rather than an activist in a social movement, Arendt separated him and his bureaucratic assistants from the German people or German culture. He was merely a manifestation of the 'thoughtless' mob's eruption into politics.³⁹

A more personal but equally striking example of this sociological legerdemain is Arendt's misjudgement of her rival for Martin Heidegger's affection, his wife, Elfride né Petri. In many ways Elfride and Arendt shared much in common. Both possessed a university education. Elfride had studied national economy. Like Arendt she had persevered in a very male discipline. That is to say, she was a 'modern' woman, a professional teacher, and understood herself as an emancipated feminist. With her husband Elfride agreed, for example, not to baptise their children in the Catholic Church. Like many intellectuals, if unusual for Heidegger's circle, she was also an antisemite and became notorious as such among his students. She attached herself to the Nazi movement before he did and to the fascist feminism of the Gertrud Scholtz-Klink variety.⁴⁰

In her assessment of Elfride, Arendt indulged a penchant all too common among intellectuals, who tend to discount their adversaries as simply cretinous. Elfride merely represented the 'mob', characterised not by the serious pursuit of wrong ideas but by an utter lack of any thinking whatsoever: 'The political convictions of the woman are generally ... untouched by any experience and fully

loaded with a closed-minded, evil, resentment-laden stupidity'. In other words, the Heideggers did not represent the tragic affinity of many educated Germans for National Socialist dreams of cultural aggrandisement. Instead Elfride embodied the simple, shallow 'murderous dementia' of the déclassé; 'It is the classic case of the mob-élite bond', Arendt wrote to her husband.⁴¹

The idea that Germans such as Elfride, or Eichmann for that matter, were anything but 'déclassés', that they felt themselves part of an up-and-coming generation, a generation bent on a progressive transformation of the world, this was something Arendt could not bring herself to confront. But Elfride and Eichmann were riding the crest of a new wave. At least before 1945, they believed themselves to be modernity's winners.

And does not Arendt's entire portrait of 'thoughtless' bureaucrats provide a rather too easy self-arrogation of moral sensitivity on the part of intellectuals in general? Rather than placing emphasis on the content, on the substance of thought as a basis for her judgements, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* rests upon a qualitative distinction between those who think and those who do not. Until recently, this has helped obscure the important role of intellectuals themselves in the Holocaust. And naturally, since no one willingly counts him or herself incapable of a thinking life, all normally come away from Arendt's book confirmed in the opinion that they are not the twerp that Eichmann was – no matter how enmeshed most of us are in large, bureaucratic organisations such as universities, government agencies, granting organisations, corporations or the like. Arendt originally intended her readers to see themselves in Eichmann, the Western Organisation Man. But one suspects that many end up congratulating themselves for possessing the moral consciousness that Eichmann supposedly lacked. This is another way in which Eichmann's Doppelgänger has become increasingly unique.

Still, let me stress that the faults found here with Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* arise only against the backdrop of her solidity and purpose. She was unquestionably right to identify Eichmann's banality in the limited sense that he did not need to be a genius or a great leader. Such evil 'is never "radical", ... it is only extreme, and ... possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension'.⁴² Holocaust studies will continue to derive inspiration from Arendt's brilliant

questions. What follows merely suggests two directions in which to take Arendt's original inquiry with more precision. Both are very much in the spirit of the founding of this journal, which encourages interdisciplinarity and seeks to synthesise disparate methodological approaches.

First, Holocaust studies should systematically evaluate sources drawn from the victims' perspective for what they tell us about National Socialist institutions and the organisation men who populated them. Second, to do this, Holocaust studies can take stock of business history and organisational theory, which have progressed a great deal since Arendt wrote *Eichmann in Jerusalem*.

A New Organisational History of the Holocaust

Grey-Collar Workers

We might recall when and where Eichmann's Doppelgänger was born. Arendt drew her portrait largely from the account that he gave of himself *in Jerusalem*. This was a very different person than *Eichmann in Berlin*. Her title should be taken much more literally, precisely because Arendt more or less privileged the voice of the perpetrator in his post-war trial.⁴³ To believe any defence narrative is risky. In this case, it also requires the almost complete dismissal of a vast, rich source on the modern management of murder itself, namely the testimony of prisoners forced to serve the bureaucracy of annihilation.⁴⁴

These survivors might be considered 'grey-collar workers'. Hermann Langbein was one such administrator-prisoner. The most famous is undoubtedly the IG Farben lab technician, Primo Levi. Prisoners worked as bookkeepers, skilled technicians, production managers, cooks, medical orderlies, engineers or secretaries. They carried out the routine tasks endemic to any bureaucracy.

Testimony from the grey zone in which they worked is never unproblematic. Prisoner-functionaries usually enjoyed extraordinary privilege. They cannot count as representative of the 'victims' perspective', as Levi himself was careful to point out. There can also be no doubt that their services contributed to the scale and scope of murder. It was not uncommon for Kapos, the prisoner-foremen of the camps, to be convicted in war crimes trials

and even executed for brutality that exceeded that of many SS men. On the other hand, privileged prisoners had the means and relative security to observe the camps. They also survived in disproportionate numbers.

The SS relied upon prisoner-bureaucrats for two reasons, both of which make grey-collar testimony uniquely valuable. First, the SS in general was chronically short-handed. The Inspector of Concentration Camps in particular lacked experienced administrative personnel. Second, qualified prisoners were readily available. For instance, Dr Josef Mengele was able to pick out first-rate pathologists from among the masses of Hungarian Jews, among them the survivor Miklos Nyiszli, who left an extremely detailed memoir of his experience.⁴⁵ Because such prisoners were indispensable and because they were often highly trained professionals, they offer valuable insights into the bureaucracy of genocide.

In many cases, grey-collar workers possessed far more advanced training than their captors. The SS officer who led the Central Construction Directorate of Auschwitz, for instance, had received his engineering degree at a vocational school. In his various departments worked the Diploma Engineer Jan Pilecki, the architect Alfred-Czeslaw Przybylski, Doctor of Civil Engineering Jerzy Widera, and the polytechnic professors Dr Szczefan Swiczowski and Dr Wladyslaw Plaskura.⁴⁶ This phenomenon was no less common among women prisoners. The Political Office of Auschwitz was led by Maximilian Grabner, a police detective with a high-school education.⁴⁷ The survivor Raya Kagan describes his staff as 'mostly uneducated people, previously skilled workers or petty officials'.⁴⁸ Yet under their command worked, for example, Irene Weiss, who had attended boarding school as a young woman and then graduated from a business school in Trnava.⁴⁹

All the conditions of bureaucratic work given as reasons for the stunted moral consciousness and blinkered perspective of the likes of Eichmann applied equally if not more so to these grey-collar workers. Were not they more subject to 'orders from above'? Were not they subject to real, rather than construed, threats should they contravene those orders? Were not they even more deeply embedded within layers of hierarchy and the division of labour? Were not they

preoccupied with even pettier details of technical work, those judged too menial for the attention of their superiors? Nevertheless, few suffered from the maladies that Eichmann seemed to suffer once he was put on trial.

The survivor-engineer Leopold Moszynski can be quoted as saying what any number of National Socialist 'technocrats' proclaimed in their defence: 'I myself only drew up very small details'.⁵⁰ However, Moszynski continued, 'From this work, which we received in order to complete it, we were able to orient ourselves. These projects were crematoria, gas chambers ... autopsy rooms ... which my team had to work up in every individual detail'.⁵¹ SS officers 'did not tell us what the plans represented', a survivor of Auschwitz's metals shop recounted, 'but on the basis of the descriptions and the drawings we were able to determine that it involved the construction of five new crematorium ovens and gas chambers'.⁵² In general, prisoner-bureaucrats had no problem discerning what when on underneath their noses. Nor did they miss the engagement of SS bureaucrats immersed in their daily work.

Historians are only now starting to evaluate such testimony in a new light. A divide has existed between document-based histories, on the one hand, and oral histories or studies of victim 'memory' on the other. It is long past time for institutional historians to bridge this gap. Few topics are more hotly debated in Holocaust studies than survivor memory as historical evidence.⁵³ General dismissal of this testimony is not uncommon. Widespread circumspection is the norm. Here is Raul Hilberg, for example:

In German documents one may discover the Holocaust in all of its bureaucratic complexity, but records of this kind tend to deal with people in the aggregate ... Yet if we look for personal accounts of the perpetrators, we will find ourselves largely stymied. The Germans left few private diaries, and their memoirs for the most part are heavily self-censored ... The situation is the reverse in the case of Jewish sources. Jewish documents ... are relatively sparse in number. On the other hand, there are multitudinous statements of survivors recording their recollections.⁵⁴

Implicit in Hilberg's statement is the assumption that survivors have

relatively little to say about the bureaucracies in which they were embedded or about the nature and personality of perpetrators.⁵⁵ Survivors are supposed to speak only about themselves.

Most likely spurred by Jan Gross's *Neighbors*, historians are now revisiting such assumptions.⁵⁶ Grey-collar testimony can illuminate those dim bureaucratic niches most directly relevant to the Holocaust, like the death camps themselves or the Political Departments, the branch of the Gestapo erected within each concentration camp.⁵⁷ Because the work of genocide was explicitly secret, much of the documentation regarding the Holocaust was either destroyed or encrusted in patent euphemisms. The survivor Kitty Hart-Moxon recalled that the destruction of Auschwitz's Political Department records took a week. A special 'Burning Kommando' had to carry it out.⁵⁸ In such cases, the victim's perspective is most probably the *only* one we are likely to get beyond the duplicitous testimony of perpetrators.

Few who survived their service in these institutional niches have ever invoked the stock clichés of bureaucratic work so common to the 1950s and 1960s. To the contrary, many survivors give accurate, rather than distorted testimony about modern bureaucracies. Let me take an example from the case I know best, the Central Construction Directorate (ZBL). One might turn to the prisoner-engineer Alfred Przybylski:

There were meetings about new construction, in which all SS men sat in one room. The details of mass murder were discussed among them. I wasn't in these discussions ... I did see, however, how all the SS men came together. I can't say exactly what was said, but directly after their conference the work was given out, and from this I drew the conclusions.⁵⁹

As in any well-organised bureaucracy, the ZBL had to rely upon the transfer of information, input and the conscious integration of individuals in collective action. It did not – as one might glean from the defence statements of perpetrators as well as many contemporary Holocaust histories – maintain mutual ignorance among atomised individuals.

It is true that the minutes of such meetings are lost to us. Historians can only reliably reconstruct dates and substance from

contemporary documents. Witness memory is a notoriously slippery record. Nevertheless survivors still knew the context of this work well. They themselves served the bureaucracy of genocide and could accurately judge its function. To stick with the example here, survivor-engineers yielded consistent testimony about the SS's *esprit de corps* that is almost *never* preserved in bureaucratic files. They repeatedly witnessed an atmosphere of ongoing, energetic innovation. One described 'a feverish work in order to find a technical solution to the ways and means to carrying through mass murder with poison gas and the incineration of the bodies in mass production fashion'.⁶⁰ An architect likewise stated that the head of Auschwitz design bureau 'did his work with excitement'.⁶¹ In fact, to believe that banal bureaucrats plodded through a slow evolutionary process and only gradually 'converted' 'normal' morgues and crematoria into gas chambers, one must ignore such testimony almost completely.

Business History and Organisation Theory

Many victims give more accurate accounts of bureaucratic work than Holocaust studies has traditionally been able to account for. Contemporary scholarship on modern organisations can supply much-needed tools with which to interpret such sources. Social scientists like Manuel Castells, Anthony Giddens, Douglass North, Michael Piore, Charles Sabel, Oliver Williamson and Shoshana Zuboff; historians like Alfred Chandler, Lauren Graham, Thomas Parke Hughes, Theodor Porter and Olivier Zunz (to name only a few) have developed much more sophisticated analyses of institutional structures and individual agency than those available to Arendt in the 1950s and 1960s. While differing greatly in their subject matter and judgements, contemporary scholars of modern organisations generally agree on several important observations.⁶²

First, institutions arise in order to increase the scope and scale of human interaction over vast distances of space and time. Internally they accomplish this by embodying decision-making in the infrastructure of technology or the rule of hierarchy, but they do so in order to enhance, accelerate and intensify communication. Externally they do this in order to respond with speed and flexibility to complex conditions at a pace that no single individual could ever

master alone. Modern institutions do not operate by obfuscating couplings between centre and periphery, the headquarters and the branch. Neither do they strive for rigid, top-down control.

Second, modern organisations flourish most that develop the most intensive connections to resources, constituent interests and, not least, other modern institutions. This is evident everywhere in the core institutions of genocide. Consider Dieter Pohl's excellent study of the Lublin District. A small cadre of the Security Police formed the key organisation of Ghetto clearance, mass shootings and the construction of death camps. Nevertheless, 'It drew the Order Police wholly into the machinery of murder. Over and above this, within the framework of perverted official assistance, the Special Service, railroad security forces, forest rangers, customs border officials, and the armed forces took part'.⁶³ Contemporary discussions of modern organisation make little recourse to concepts like '*Polykratie*' to explain this phenomenon, and this is precisely because the multiplicity of interconnected institutions hardly counts as any great surprise. All industrialised nation states are 'Behemoths', but they clearly do not endlessly consume themselves by internecine strife, incompetence and inefficient organisation – as Holocaust studies is so often wont to portray Nazi Germany. Manuel Castells, for instance, does not call this '*Polykratie*'; he calls it the 'network society'.⁶⁴ Henry Eskowitz and Loet Leydesdorff call it the 'Triple Helix' of university-industrial-state relations.⁶⁵

Third, modern institutions are not fuelled by the 'alienation' and 'atomisation' of those who inhabit them. Institutions malfunction most when they estrange those who run them. Dynamic institutions invariably take scrupulous care over the motivation and *esprit de corps* of their employees.⁶⁶ They necessarily depend upon the creativity and initiative of lower levels. They hold individuals accountable, to be sure, but they tend to demand access to information over rigid subordination. Individuals, in turn, tend to mobilise the unique capabilities of modern organisations for communication, command and control for the formulation of identity and community otherwise inaccessible to any lone individual.

Historians are now beginning to explore the extent to which many Nazi party activists participated in the Holocaust as a massive and perverse act of identity politics. Once it is recognised that the

mobilisation of community is part and parcel of modern organisation (rather than anathema to it), Holocaust studies can begin to explain why and how institutions set about constructing a modern Germany through the identity politics of genocide.

Conclusion

Scholarship on modern organisations opens a door to the re-evaluation of sources and can restore Arendt's original purpose: to make the likes of Eichmann relevant to our assessment of modern, organised society. Where many scholars now seek to distance themselves from the investigation of modernity and the Holocaust, Arendt identified the uniqueness of the Holocaust in its mobilisation of modern institutions and their organisation men. As Charles Maier has argued, Holocaust studies can abandon this core comparative impulse in Arendt's work only at the expense of its relevance.⁶⁷

To name but one example of how relevant new sources and more sophisticated organisational theory can be, one might turn to the current explosion of regional case studies. These have repeatedly encountered modern institutions in action on location. Rather than a world of petty-minded bureaucrats in an institutional straightjacket, Nazi Germany unleashed a groundswell of initiative from below. This should be no surprise, for multi-functional bureaucrats and the enthusiasm they bring to their work were and are normal in modern institutions. This reality of modern institutions – their ability to reach into the most varied and chaotic of local conditions, their facility to react, adapt and convey information rapidly between centre and periphery, the fluidity within them of boundaries between individuals, hierarchy and community – all of this so poorly fits the stock clichés of bureaucracy in Holocaust studies, that some have been led to declare, as Arendt did of Auschwitz itself: These are no bureaucracies! This is not modern!⁶⁸

Such misunderstandings, coupled as they are to stereotypes that stem from nearly half a century ago, partly account for why theories much debated within Holocaust studies rarely find an audience outside of it. The very strength of Arendt's fundamental questions lay in her insistence that Eichmann differed little from bureaucrats

anywhere in the West. Should it not therefore be a wake-up call that a voluminous scholarship on modern institutions has long ago discarded the caricatures prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s when Arendt wrote?

Arendt and those who invoke her have always been right about her most fundamental observation: many people were and are like Eichmann. No organised society ever lacks people prepared to do as he did. The only problem has been that the real Western Organisation Man has resembled the real, historic Eichmann much more than his Doppelgänger, the non-sentient drone. It is the enthusiasm, that which prisoner narratives capture so vividly, and the content of the conscience of the bureaucrats of annihilation that bears explanation, not the absence of these.

NOTES

1. Michael Wildt, *Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002).
2. Yaacov Lozowick, *Hitler's Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil* (London: Continuum, 2000); Hans Safrian, *Die Eichmann Männer* (Wien: Europa Verlag, 1993). Most recently, David Cesarani, *Eichmann: His Life and Crimes* (London: Heinemann, 2004).
3. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin, 1994), pp.26, 54, 287–8 (original emphasis).
4. Compare, for instance, the comments in Richard Bessel's review of Lozowick's book in the *Times Literary Supplement*, 24 January 2003; or Christopher Browning, *Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), pp.3–4. Compare these affirmations of Arendt's thesis to their own most recent explorations of National Socialism and its 'organisation men': Richard Bessel, 'The Nazi Capture of Power', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.39 (2004); Christopher Browning and Jürgen Matthäus, *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942* (London: Heinemann, 2004). There is currently such a flood of excellent institutional history in Holocaust Studies, that a brief list could not do justice to them. For a sampling, see Wolfgang Seibel and Gerald Feldman (ed.), *Networks of Nazi Persecution: Bureaucracy, Business, and the Organisation of the Holocaust* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004).
5. Testimony of Josef Ludwig, Zentralstelle für Landesjustizverwaltung Ludwigsburg, IV 4B AR-Z 82/1968: Band III. Statements of pride were not infrequent. See Gideon Greif, 'Die "Sonderkommandos" von Auschwitz-Birkenau: Ein historischer Überblick', in idem (ed.), *Wir weinten Tränenlos ... Augenzeugenberichte der jüdischen 'Sonderkommandos' in Auschwitz* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1995), p.xxxi.
6. Henry Friedlander, *The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Michael

- Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), esp. the introduction; Michael Burleigh, 'Political Religion and Social Evil', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol.3, No.2 (2002), pp.1-17; Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.36-7.
7. Hannah Arendt, 'Introduction', in Bernd Naumann, *Auschwitz* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), pp.xvii-xviii, xi.
 8. Aumeier was Schutzhaftlagerführer of Auschwitz, commanding the inner grounds of the camp. See his affidavit in Signature VS26/1-155, Dokumentationsarchiv österreichischer Widerstand (DöW), microfilm roll 1107.
 9. Michael Massing, 'Trial and Error', *New York Times*, Sunday, 17 October 2004, p.17.
 10. Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen and Volker Rieß, *The Good Old Days: The Holocaust as Seen by Its Perpetrators and Bystanders* (New York: Konecky and Konecky, 1991).
 11. Massing, 'Trial and Error', p.17.
 12. Hans Speier, *German White-Collar Workers and the Rise of Hitler* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), p.9. Speier's essays appeared first before 1934; Mills work would culminate in C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951). The Nazis had suppressed the publication of Speier's work in 1934, and his essays did not appear in any accessible form in German until Jürgen Kocka finally had the full manuscript published in 1977. Mills had read them in manuscript form. Second quote from Siedfried Kracauer, *Die Angestellten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971; repr. 1929), p.91.
 13. Arno Mayer, 'The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol.47 (1975), p.409.
 14. Cited after Olivier Zunz, *Making America Corporate 1870-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp.2-3; Wright Mills, *White Collar*, pp.xv, xvii; and idem, 'The Morale of the Cheerful Robots', pp.233-5.
 15. Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilisation* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1963; repr. 1934), pp.177.
 16. John Ralston Saul, *Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).
 17. On Europe in general, see Charles Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp.121-52. On France, see Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanisation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), pp.70-102; and Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars Clean Bodies: Decolonisation and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). On Japan, see Simon Partner, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp.51-66. On Austria, see Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonisation and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). On Germany, see Volker Berghahn, *The Americanisation of West German Industry 1945-1973* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), esp. pp.26-39, 230-59; idem, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

18. Vance Packard, *The Pyramid Climbers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp.11; Translated as *Die Pyramiden-Kletterer*, this book was reprinted in 1963, 1965, 1966, 1968 and later. Likewise David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950) was printed in West Germany in 1956 and reprinted in 1958, 1960, 1961, 1964 and 1970.
19. Martin Heidegger, *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge: 1. Einblick in das was ist Bremer Vorträge 1949* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), pp.26, 56.
20. As James Melton has pointed out, nostalgia for a supposedly simple order that predates modern industrial capitalism is not uncommon in social history, nor is it foreign to popular theoreticians such as Pierre Nora or E.P. Thompson's conceptions of 'moral economy' versus 'political economy'. James Melton, 'Introduction: Continuities in German Historical Scholarship, 1933–1960', in James Melton and Hartmut Lehmann (eds.), *Paths of Continuity: Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); James Melton, 'From Folk History to Structural History: Otto Brunner (1898–1982) and the Radical-Conservative Roots of German Social History', in Melton and Lehmann (eds.), *Paths of Continuity*. This nostalgia is also readily detectable, for instance, in Zygmunt Bauman's hostility for Norbert Elias's *The Civilizing Process*.
21. Charles Maier's point that Holocaust studies cannot be considered much more than footnotes to Arendt's work cannot really be disputed. See Charles Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *American Historical Review*, Vol.105 (2000).
22. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p.268.
23. Hannah Arendt, *The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age* (New York: Grove Press, 1978), p.230.
24. *Ibid.*, p.229. Compare the equally passionate insistence on judgement by her teacher Karl Jaspers, though with a different emphasis on the consciousness of guilt and culpability: Karl Jaspers, *Die Schuldfrage: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage* (Zürich: Artemis Verlag, 1946), esp. p.42.
25. Arendt, *The Jew as Pariah*, p.110. This is from an essay originally published in 1946. There is much talk about how Arendt stole her ideas from Raul Hilberg. Here, however, is the much-cited 'self-acting' thesis in its essential form long before Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). Compare to Hilberg's 1961 edition, p.18: 'The bureaucrats wanted only the authority, the backing, the signal from above'; 'The German bureaucracy was so sensitive a mechanism that in the right climate it began to function almost by itself'.
26. Comment by William Sheridan Allen and Walter Laqueur, 'Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem: The Controversy Revisited', in Lyman Legters (ed.), *Western Society after the Holocaust* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp.123–4.
27. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), p.231.
28. *Ibid.*, p.36ff.
29. This is the only book in a long series of 'Holocaust controversies' in which enough substance exists continually to provoke new discussions. Long after Hannah Arendt exchanged blows with Walter Laqueur and Dr Jacob Robinson in a forum provided by the *New York Review of Books* in 1965–66, Laqueur was invited to revisit this debate in the 1980s in a special volume on *Arendt in Jerusalem*; in 1996 the Journal

- History and Memory* likewise published the collected papers of a special conference on the same theme. These are only the English-language events; there were others in Germany. Most recently Stephen Ascheim has edited *Arendt in Jerusalem*. And some like myself were not even born when *Eichmann in Jerusalem* was first published. This is a sign of the vitality, certainly not the futility, of these ongoing discussions. There is something in Arendt; we return to her books over and over again.
30. Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (New York: Vintage, 1988), p.42; Rudolf Vrba, 'Die misachtete Warnung', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol.44 (1996); Rudolf Vrba, *I Escaped from Auschwitz* (Fort Lee: Barricade Books, 2002), pp.266–78.
 31. Omer Bartov, 'Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust', *American Historical Review*, Vol.103 (1998); idem, *Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide and Modern Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); see also Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002).
 32. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p.60.
 33. David Schoenbaum in his comment on Walter Laqueur, 'Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem: The Controversy Revisited', in Legters (ed.), *Western Society after the Holocaust*, p.128.
 34. See the essays and introduction in Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, 'The Study of Mass Murder and Genocide', in Ben Kiernan and Robert Gellately (eds.), *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Frank Chalk and Kurt Johnassohn (eds.), *The History and Sociology of Genocide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).
 35. Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, p.252.
 36. Zunz, *Making America Corporate*, p.3.
 37. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1973), part one, p.107, part two, p.35.
 38. Compare to the quite different conception of democracy and totalitarianism in J.L. Talmon, *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952).
 39. Seyla Benhabib, 'Identity, Perspective and Narrative in Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem*', *History and Memory*, Vol.8 (1996).
 40. Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, pp.418–20.
 41. Quotations from Rüdiger Safranski, *Ein Meister aus Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1995), pp.418, 247; Anson Rabinbach, *In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), pp.146–58.
 42. Arendt, *The Jew as Pariah*, p.251.
 43. This has always been a charge levelled by extreme 'intentionalists', e.g. Lucy Dawidowicz's objections to Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* and Stanley Milgram's obedience experiments. See 'How They Teach the Holocaust', *Commentary* (December 1990), pp.25–32. See also the recent observations by Massing, 'Trial and Error', on Arendt's complete disregard for witness testimony. Donald Bloxham has noted this as well, although he is predominantly preoccupied with debunking 'intentionalism'. See Donald Bloxham, *Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory* (Oxford:

- Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.202, 208–9. On the affinity between say Hans Mommsen and defence arguments advanced by the likes of Albert Speer, see Michael Thad Allen, 'The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work', *Central European History*, Vol.30 (1997), pp.253–8.
44. The Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, for instance, relied upon the affidavits of 252 witnesses and called 356 witnesses to the stand. Of these 356, 220 – the vast majority – were survivors. Werner Renz, 'Der erste Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozess: Völkermord als Strafsache', *Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts*, Vol.15 (2000), pp.29, 39.
 45. Miklos Nyiszli, *Auschwitz: A Doctor's Eyewitness Account* (New York: Arcade, 1993).
 46. Their testimonies are included in the records of the Austrian trial of two architects of Auschwitz which took place in January and February 1972, Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm roll 1106, 1107, 1108.
 47. Maximilian Grabner, 'RuSHA Akte', in Berlin Document Center collection, United States National Archives and Records Administration.
 48. Raya Kagan, 'Das Standesamt Auschwitz', in H.G. Adler, Herman Langbein and Ella Lingens-Reiner (eds.), *Auschwitz: Zeugnisse und Berichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1988), p.148.
 49. Irene Weiss, 'survivor video', in *HVA-SVHF, interviewed by Brenda Braun* (Survivor); see also Lore Shelly, *Secretaries of Death: Accounts by Former Who Worked in the Gestapo of Auschwitz* (New York: Shengold Publishers, 1986); Kagan, 'Das Standesamt Auschwitz'.
 50. Leopold Moszynski, 'Testimony', in Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm roll 1107 (1972).
 51. Leopold Moszynski, 'Zeugenvernehmung', in Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm roll 1106 (1966).
 52. Zeugenvernehmung of Bronislaw Galuszka, 4 Nov. 1965, Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm 1106, read into the trial record, 8 February 1972. See also Dejacó's response, testimony of 16 February 1972, Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm 1107. Galuszka's testimony was hardly unique, for instance, testimony of Dr Szczefan Swiszowski, 7 March 1972 and testimony of Rudolf Kauer, 2 February 1972, in Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm roll 1107. Prisoners also testified who worked as archivists in the ZBL records.
 53. Several historians have recently challenged this trend. See Jan Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp.139–40; Browning, *Collected Memories*, esp. pp.37–59; see also Omer Bartov, 'Passing into History: Nazism and the Holocaust beyond Memory', *History and Memory*, Vol.9 (1997); Bartov, 'Defining Enemies, Making Victims'; and commentary, *American Historical Review*, Vol.103 (1998), pp.1177–90, esp. of Paul Miller and Vinay Lal.
 54. Raul Hilberg, 'I Was Not There', in Berel Lang (ed.), *Writing and the Holocaust* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), p.18. In practice, when Hilberg finds survivor testimony relevant to perpetrators and their organisations, he uses it as such. Compare his recent book on methods, *Sources of Holocaust Research* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), p.153, and esp. his discussion of the former Sonderkommando prisoner David Olère, p.167. See also Rebecca Wittmann, 'The Wheels of Justice Turn Slowly: The Pretrial Investigations of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–65', *Central European History*, Vol.35 (2002), pp.364–5.

55. Lawrence Douglas, *The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), pp.123–50.
56. Gross, *Neighbors*; Wittmann, 'The Wheels of Justice Turn Slowly'; Rebecca Wittmann, *Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).
57. Shelley, *Secretaries of Death*; idem, *Auschwitz – The Nazi Civilisation: Twenty-Three Women Prisoners' Accounts* (New York: University Press of America, 1992).
58. Kitty Hart-Moxon, survivor video, in *HVA-SVHF, interviewed by Corinne Oppenheimer*.
59. Testimony of Alfred Przybylski, 17 February 1972, Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm roll 1107.
60. Rudolf Kauer to Geschworenengericht beim Oberlandsgericht, Wien, 21 February 1972, Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm roll 1108.
61. Testimony of Ludwig Lawin, 17 February 1972, Signature V526/1-155, DöW, microfilm roll 1107.
62. To cite just some of the exemplary work by these authors: Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age, Economy, Society, and Culture, Volume 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Anthony Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Alfred Chandler, *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Loren Graham, *What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian Experience?* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Thomas Parke Hughes, *Rescuing Prometheus* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Theodore Porter, *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Oliver Williamson, *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications* (London: Macmillan, 1975); Shoshana Zuboff, *In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1988). Recently more scholars have begun to bring the methods of organisational and business history to the study of institutions of the Third Reich, esp. Mark Spoerer, 'Profitierten Unternehmen von KZ-Arbeit? Eine kritische Analyse der Literatur', *Historische Zeitschrift*, Vol.268 (1999); Mark Spoerer, *Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz: ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und Häftlinge im Deutschen Reich und im besetzten Europa 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001); Jeffrey Fear, *Organizing Control: August Thyssen and the Construction of German Corporate Management* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). In addition economic and business historians have begun to turn their attention to case studies of corporations during the Nazi period: Gerald Feldman, *Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Lothar Gall (ed.), *Die Deutsche Bank* (Munich: Beck, 1995); Werner Abelshauser, Raymond Stokes et al., *German Industry and Global Enterprise BASF: The History of a Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). They join Peter Hayes, one of the few business historians to have written consistently on the Third Reich: see *From Cooperation to Complicity: Degussa in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
63. Dieter Pohl, *Von der 'Judenpolitik' zum Judenmord: Der Distrikt Lublin des*

- Generalgouvernements 1939–1944* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993), pp.403–4.
64. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*.
65. Loet Leydesdorff and Henry Etzkowitz, 'Emergence of a Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations', *Science and Public Policy*, Vol.23 (1996), pp.279–86.
66. See the articles by Werner Abelshauser, Mark Casson, Gerold Ambrosius and Martin Fielder, in 'Neue Institutionenökonomik als historische Sozialwissenschaft', special issue of *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol.27, No.4 (2001).
67. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History'.
68. Pohl, *Von der 'Judenpolitik' zum Judenmord*, pp.404–5; applied by Hans Mommsen to Auschwitz as well: Hans Mommsen, *Auschwitz, 17. Juli 1942: Der Weg zur europäischen 'Endlösung der Judenfrage'* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 2002): 168–9. pp.168–9.